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Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press. 
 
Although driven by a Peircean biosemiotic perspective, at the centre of this 
remarkable volume, both physically and figuratively, is von Foerster’s positing of 
‘second-order cybernetics’, a systems theory which includes and considers the 
consequences of the existence of an observer. Søren Brier’s extended discussion of 
second-order thinking is pre-figured in all that appears in the first part of the book 
while also overshadowing the second half. Yet, the book under review is not just a 
treatise on von Foerster. As this volume demonstrates, Brier is brilliant at cutting 
through and across disciplines, evacuating the verbiage of disciplinary paraphernalia, 
and projecting into the future, seeing what is needed for knowledge to progress 
rather than what might help further specialization or cause disciplines to perpetuate 
themselves. In his cybersemiotics he productively synthesizes not specialisms but 
generalisms, intellectual approaches that, on their own, have been branded, from 
the vantage point of the institutionalized bastion of specialization, as imperialistic 
attempts at providing a ‘master discipline’. These generalisms include semiotics, 
(second-order) cybernetics (and Luhmann’s systems theory), cognitive science, 
philosophy of science and biosemiotics. As well as forging the new field of 
cybersemiotics, the synthesis suggests radical change within the fields from which it 
draws. 
This article will be concerned with the following areas that are surveyed, 
evaluated and re-animated in the volume: second-order thinking and the role of the 
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observer; the understanding of communication and information after Luhmann; and 
ethology, biosemiotics and autopoiesis. Yet, the fact that Brier refers to established 
and emergent fields should not lead one to imagine for a second that cybersemiotics 
offers nothing new. What is refreshing about this volume is the recurrence of at 
least four key themes, treated in a novel and quite urgent fashion, which encourage 
readers to see the world with rinsed out eyes. If one was forced to brutally pollard 
Brier’s work, one would observe at the centre a pre-occupation with  
 
1. the failure of all disciplines to recognize and adequately account for 
qualia; 
2. the repression of arguments about motivation and its consequences 
in communication (and the slow progress made in understanding the 
role of emotions even by theories of embodiment); 
3. the status of ‘knowing’ contra  the computational information-
processing paradigm; 
4. the apprehension of reality after quantum theory, the notion of 
Umwelt and constructivism 
 
One would also see a critical grasp of Brier’s maitres de penser: Luhmann, 
Reventlow, von Foerster, Lakoff/Johnson, (Maturana/Varela and Wittgenstein in 
slightly lesser roles), and the special case of Peirce.  
The volume’s jacket contains a puff which I was very happy to give to 
University of Toronto Press after first reading the manuscript. There, I suggested 
that Brier’s name will be spoken in the same breath as that of Wiener and Bateson. I 
might have added von Foerster to those names but, as I hope what follows suggests, 
cybersemiotics, if not supplanting second-order cybernetics, goes some way beyond 
it. For those who have limited time to read a positive review article, I should say now 
that this one, in effect, is an amplification of my puff on the jacket.  
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Preliminaries 
Brier’s stated goals alone in this volume reveal his ambition. It is not a book about 
‘pure’ philosophy, despite the fact that it should have an impact on philosophy. 
Rather, it is “an attempt to conduct a constructive philosophy of science addressing 
an interdisciplinary scientific problem on the border of philosophy and science” 
(149). The reason for this is that the very notion of information science concerns 
epistemological and ontological assumptions. The well known problem of cognitive 
science’s information processing paradigm is to do with the role of embodiment in 
cognition, understanding, and communication. Thus, cybersemiotics seeks to 
understand the role of the embodied mind in cognition and communication (4). 
Based on ethology and biosemiotics, Brier contends “that our cognition manifests 
itself as embodied semiosis motivated by biological, psychological, and social 
interests, which are powerful creators of structure and meaning in our spheres of 
signification” (310). The guiding ideas of information processing and rationality have 
had considerable purchase in philosophy and cognitive science; but Cybersemiotics 
is initially a lamentation on the fact that “There is no satisfactory theory of life and 
the inner world of first person experiences” (363). It sets itself the task of explaining 
qualia, life, and consciousness as emergent phenomena resulting from the evolution 
of material, energetic, and informational systems (23). 
The way that the volume seeks to realize its goals is through a set of far-
reaching connections between disciplines, perspectives and intellectual figures. For 
Brier, the self-referring autopoietic observer in second-order cybernetics is to be 
seen as a development of the biological understanding of Peirce’s concept of the 
Interpretant, a development comprising the knower, the known and the process of 
knowing. In order to connect Peirce’s semiotic philosophy to modern scientific 
understanding his Tychism is seen “as a further development of Prigogine and 
Stengers’ discussion of the objectivity of chance” (100) and compatible in some ways 
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with important aspects of the work of Maturana, von Foerster and Luhmann. The 
latter, especially, is called to account for his blind spot in relation to the concepts of 
‘person’ and ‘sign’ (251). In consonance with the second-order orientation of 
thinking, the volume pits most perspectives against the ideas of pragmatic language 
philosophy or “languaging” (Maturana; cf. Wittgenstein) and cognitive semantics 
(Lakoff and Johnson). 
Amidst the wealth of reference in Cybersemiotics, though, there is one point 
that should not be missed. That is, the volume should be understood as a pivotal 
contribution to the epistemological break constituted by biosemiotics. Brier argues – 
rather persuasively - that cybernetic researchers made important progress and must 
be incorporated into modern biosemiotics (317). It is often forgotten that Sebeok 
made the same point about semiotics and its kinship with General Systems Theory, 
pointing out that Bertalanffy first presented his ideas in Morris’s semiot ic seminar in 
1937 and observing, as Brier concurs, that information as communication and action 
is “always borne on a marker” (Sebeok 1977: 185). 
In marrying second-order cybernetics and contemporary semiotics, as well as 
the many other things he does in this book, Brier offers 12 chapters plus an 
introduction (plus a Foreword by Marcel Danesi). Chapter 1 launches the critique of 
the information-processing paradigm and its role in a projected unified science. The 
second chapter is concerned with knowledge, particularly the ‘objectivist’ vs. 
‘internalist’ versions of knowing. Chapter 3 introduces Brier’s discussion of ethology 
and, in particular, Reventlow’s empirical work leading to the observation of the 
phenomenon he calls ‘rependium’. If you were in the lucky position of having a 
comprehensive knowledge of the numerous other topics that Brier discusses in this 
book, then, as I indicate below, this is the chapter that you would not wish to miss. 
Chapter 4 contains a discussion of Bateson on information in relation to the idea of 
autopoiesis. Chapter 5 is, as suggested above, the pivotal point in the book and 
features a cogent disquisition on von Foerster and second-order thinking. The sixth 
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chapter is a detailed and stimulating discussion of Peirce. Chapter 7 discusses 
cognitive semantics and, in Chapter 8, the degree of synthesis in the volume 
becomes clear as the topics of Umwelten, animal communication, autopoiesis and 
Peircean biosemiotics are brought together. Chapter 9 stresses the evolutionary 
view central to cybersemiotics while Chapter 10 revisits, in cybersemiotic mode, the 
concepts of information, signification, cognition and communication. Chapter 11, 
seemingly disciplinary (rather than transdisciplinary) since it focuses on Library and 
Information Science, is surprisingly rewarding. Since it has much to say about both 
computation and the human ordering of knowledge (for now and the future), those 
who imagine that it will be about where to put books on shelves are particularly 
recommended to read it. The final chapter sets up a five-leveled cybersemiotic 
framework for the investigation of information, cognition and communication. In all, 
the volume amounts to 477 pages; these are liberally peppered with diagrams and 
figures which, in the main, do a good explicatory job. 
 
The observer and second order 
Taking the ‘cyber’ in cybersemiotics, the crucial point is that it refers to second-
order cybernetics – that is, the systems theory which follows the insights into the 
importance of factoring in the observer of all observations. Mainly associated with 
von Foerster (and, now, Brier), to the uninitiated the need to consider the observer 
of systems seems obscure. Yet, it is central to definitions of science and to the 
process of knowing. Von Foerster (1991: 65 – quoted on page 218) asks whether one 
is to consider oneself apart from the universe (“That is, whenever I look, I’m looking 
as through a peephole upon an unfolding universe”) or whether one is to consider 
oneself a part of the universe (“That is, whenever I act, I’m changing myself and the 
universe”). Put another way “Is the world the primary cause?” or “Is my experience 
the primary cause?” These matters, it seems, are undecidable; yet von Foerster 
welcomes such undecideability because it forces analysis to take into account the 
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relational framework – the position of the observer – by which questions might 
become decidable. Those questions that are already decidable are always already in 
a relational framework – they have eliminated the need to consider the role of the 
observer because their decidability seems self-evident, their relational framework 
amounting simply to ‘the nature of things’. In recognizing this point, von Foerster 
does lean towards the conclusion that cognitive systems should actually be 
considered as part of the universe and that the vagaries of such systems should be 
seen as ‘primary causes’. The mode of observing and the mere existence of an 
observer – with all an observer’s impinging vicissitudes, psychological and physical – 
makes a difference to what constitutes observations. Brier notes that this is a 
“constructivist” worldview and “somewhat phenomenological” (219). Citing 
Spencer-Brown, he adds that it encourages a “start in the middle” in acquiring 
knowledge, “to begin with neither the subject nor object, but with the process of 
knowing within the project of living” (221). One might also add that it is a 
perspective conducive to anti-individualist investigations into cognitive activity. 
Fortuitously, second-order cybernetics, in forcing consideration of the observer, 
opens the way for ‘first-person experience’, a focus on agency – but not the 
ideological construct of individual will – in the process of knowing and the operation 
of systems. Cybersemiotics can be seen as the realizing of that project. 
Lurking behind the concept of the second order, too, is the problematic 
equation of organic and machine activity, an equation that has dogged cybernetics 
and cognitive science. Brier quotes Sommerhoff on the reasons for the gulf between 
organism and machine being immense. In short, no machine has as yet been 
designed with the organic integration of self-regulation, self-reproduction, self-
repair and self-maintenance (209). Second-order cybernetics is shown to be 
primarily a project concerned with “how cognition, information and communication 
arise from living systems’ self-organizing activity” and with the organization of lived 
realities or ‘Umwelten’ (209). To this end, von Foerster’s observations on trivial 
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machines are introduced twice as he “delivers a fatal blow to the prevalent idea of 
an objective information science that a cognitive science can be built upon” (212). If 
an organism is to be viewed as a machine it is non-trivial for the reason that “A non-
trivial machine is mathematically unpredictable because every time it runs a 
function it changes the state from which the function will run the next time. In this 
way the next run becomes unpredictable” (24). “Non-trivial machines change their 
state (way of computing) every time they comprehend a computation” (214). Not 
only do these observations introduce the observer as a meaningful entity in the 
composition of any world, they also bring into question those perspectives in 
science that repress or negate the observer in the fashion of Laplace. How can a 
brain scientist, asks von Foerster (quoted on page 210), develop a theory of the 
brain when the theory of the brain is written in such a fashion that it writes itself? 
Following a path first trodden by Bateson, second-order cybernetics moved 
from “the objectivistic, denotative, and logical theories of information and 
language” and toward “more constructivist theories, going beyond social 
constructivism by moving into biology or even beginning with biology and moving 
from there towards sociology” (24). ‘Information’ is thus “something an observer 
notes as internally created in an autopoietic system and which has formed structural 
couplings in reaction to perturbations from the environment”. For Brier, then, 
second-order thinking is very much bound up with grasping that living systems (as 
opposed to machines) are self-creating and closed but are so in tandem with their 
environment; yet, as he writes, biological and cognitive functioning is still hampered 
by the vocabulary of information: 
 
Von Foerster considered the nervous system as a closed functional system, 
because like Bateson he grasped that the real evolutionary and thinking 
system is the organism plus its cognitive domain, as Bateson pointed out. In 
his conceptual forerunner for biosemiotics Jakob von Uexküll called it 
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Innenwelt and Umwelt. Maturana and Varela have, with their theory of 
autopoiesis, expressed the same phenomenon. According to them, living 
systems’ connections to their environments, plus their mutual communicative 
connections, can be conceptualized as “structural couplings”. These structural 
couplings organize the cognitive apparatus established through evolution. The 
“cognitive domain” is then the world of cognitive processes of a living system, 
and includes the totality of structural couplings. Maturana and Varela declare 
that everything in the organism is structurally dependent. Unfortunately, 
partly because they do not want to use the objectivist category of information, 
they continue to use cybernetic explanatory terms even when they speak 
about the living system’s cognitive domain. But their idea of dependence is a 
non-deterministic mechanicism (24). 
 
It is because of these problems of terminology that cybersemiotics seeks to 
reinvigorate cybernetics with the vocabulary and perspectives of ethology, 
‘languaging’ and semiotics. Yet, more than equally, it should be remembered that 
this book demonstrates that “Second-order cybernetics brings to semiotics the ideas 
of closure, structural couplings, interpenetration, and languaging” (italics in original, 
99). 
If Cybersemiotics achieves the task of bringing second-order cybernetics and 
semiotics closer together, it has accomplished a great deal with two potentially 
resistant generalisms. On the one hand, as Brier points out, “ researchers in 
autopoiesis theory and second-order cybernetics distance themselves from 
‘symbolism’ and reference theories by thinking about analytical language 
philosophy, logical positivistic reference theory with empty logic symbols, or the 
like”. These are worlds away from Peirce’s semiotics. For Brier, where Peirce, von 
Foerster, and Maturana meet, is in the process of interpretation. Unfortunately, von 
Foerster, Luhmann, and Maturana use the concept of ‘symbol’ and do not reflect on 
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signs. Typically, Luhmann tends to treat semiotics as an enemy to be kept at bay 
(probably because he conflates Peircean and Saussurean sign theory); Brier, 
diplomatically, notes that Luhmann’s knowledge of Peirce, despite a 1993 essay on 
signs, is not profound (252). On the other side, despite Sebeok’s comments of 1977 
and elsewhere and biosemiotics’ salute to the heritage of Bateson (see Hoffmeyer 
2008a), semiotics has failed to tease out and exploit the commonalities between its 
own endeavour and that of systems theory. The reason that the meeting of the two 
fields is imperative is that information is not enough (!) 
 
Information and communication after Luhmann 
Through Maclup’s famous analysis of the concept of information Brier points to 
some of the – often unrealistic - expectations regarding the concept of information 
brought forth in both cybernetics and in cognitive science understandings of the 
term: 
 
1. Information should be about something previously unknown. 
2. Information should be about something barely known. 
3. Information should affect the scope of, or the structure of, the receiver's 
knowledge. 
4. Information must only consist of un-interpreted “raw” data. 
5. Information should be useful. 
6. Information can be used in decision-making. 
7. Information should affect the receiver's possible actions. 
8. Information should reduce the receiver's uncertainty. 
9. Information should help to identify the contextual meaning of words 
10. Information should change the receiver's acceptances/assumptions, 
especially as to the disposition of possibilities (for actions) (60) 
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Brier notes that each of them are limited and fail – even together - to capture the 
richness of cognitive operations. For in semiotics - in contrast - information is not a 
matter of quantifiable bits. On the other hand for information theory, the matter of 
signification is largely irrelevant (although Shannon [1948: 379] does concede its 
prevalence in communication). These are the fundamental differences that Brier 
delineates although, as will be seen, his characterization of semiotics as “based in 
human language’s meaningful communication” and as “phenomenological” (42) 
might be deemed unfortunate although, at this stage, he is largely introducing 
semiology to the uninitiated. The strategy that Brier suggests for dealing with these 
two fundamental differences in approaching information is sound: that is, the 
evacuation of the semantic, communicative connotation of the term, pointing to the 
foundational gestures of Wiener and Shannon and avoiding the ‘paradigm 
competion’ of information theory and semiotics (62). Yet, he does this, as will be 
mentioned briefly (cf. Cobley 2010b), with reference to languaging and Wittgenstein 
rather than with signification and the history of semiotics. 
Nevertheless, even with the evacuation of ‘meaning’ from information, taking  
information theory at its own word as being scientific and mathematical, Brier’s 
analysis of the matter is sufficiently illuminating in respect of information theory’s 
lacunae to make it worthwhile quoting his eleven objections in full: 
 
1. Different information systems such as humans, machines, animals, and 
organizations process information in the same way. What is crucial is not 
the hardware but the software. What is essential are the algorithms in 
the program that process information. This is the central idea in the 
information-processing paradigm. It is often called functionalism, 
because it is the function, not the structure that is crucial. 
2. Conscious logical thinking is generally taken as a model for cognitive 
processes. It does not consider intuitive and emotionally based sources 
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for cognition. 
3. Understanding is viewed as classical-categorical. The analytical-
categorical of classical set theory is emphasized. 
4. Cognitive processes can be broken down into component parts and 
finally into a series of linear choices. Perception is primarily categorical 
and denotative (concrete description) and organized as classical sets. 
5. Learning happens according to rules and principles and primarily 
according to the construction of structures of knowledge. 
6. A language system is viewed primarily as a formal mechanism for 
transferring information via symbol manipulation between humans, 
machines and the human-machine. 
7. The subject is primarily a cognitive subject, where embodiment and 
emotions play a minor role. 
8. The cognitive subject is analogous to the computer. 
9. The mechanism behind memory, the growth of meaning, and the 
handling and understanding of symbols is a so-called “semantic 
network”. When one attempts to define the meaning of symbols and 
ideas lexically, this occurs with reference to other symbols and 
conceptions in a logical way. Meaning thus hangs within a network of 
mutually defined conceptions: a so-called “knowledge structure”. The 
cognitive viewpoint is in this way very structural. This network is an 
effect of the aforementioned approaches and has a denotative and 
atomic character. It represents a formal entry into semantics. Put in 
another way, words are primarily context-free lexically described 
symbols. 
10. The emphasis on the syntactic-structural aspect in cognition, thought, 
and communication leads to a decreased interest in the cultural-societal 
and historical dimensions of the meaning of human cognition and 
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communication. This clearly makes the social sciences, humanities, and 
arts much less important in finding the processes of the construction of 
meaning than most researchers within these domains themselves 
believe. 
11. The meaning of language is primarily seen as the logical truth conditions 
of the mapping of the concepts of the contents of sentences upon the 
“natural things or kinds” of the world. This approach stresses logical 
analysis and the idea that meaning is captured by so-called truth 
conditions. Determination of truth tends to be based on a 
transcendental “God’s eye” view of knowledge (56-7). 
 
All eleven of these points – with the possible exception of 5 - could be remedied or 
at least addressed by a semiotically inflected cognitive theory, the basis for which 
Brier is proposing in this book. 
In his project of bringing together fields, however, one of Brier’s main targets 
for both praise and criticism is the work of Luhmann. The main feature of Luhmann’s 
work identified by Brier is that there are psychic as well as and social-communicative 
systems that are qualitatively different from the biological autopoietic systems 
identified by Maturana and Varela. For Brier, the systematization of the social that 
Luhmann’s critics have found so difficult to stomach because it seems to be such an 
assault on humanism, has certain advantages in spite of these problems  because it 
demonstrates that communicative systems are autonomous, functionally closed and 
autopoietic (238). Thereby one must admit - whether one likes it or not – that 
Luhmann develops and extends the cybernetic and systemic thinking paradigm in 
what is presently the most advanced version extant in the realm of the ‘social’. It is 
true that Brier’s relation to Luhmann’s work is ambivalent – his criticisms of 
Luhmann are actually the core ideas of this book and will be considered below. Yet, 
what Brier finds congenial about Luhmann demands comment. Clearly, Luhmann 
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proposes radical changes in the understandings of communication and information 
in the sphere of the social. “Communication”, he writes,  
 
is not at all what the commonly held view (and quite often the ill-considered 
scientific use) of this concept takes it to be, viz. a process of “transferring” 
meaning or information... it is a shared actualization of meaning that is able to 
inform at least one of the participants… The notion of such a “transfer” 
already runs into trouble by assuming the identity of what is to be transferred 
and thus that possession is relinquished when this transfer takes place, i.e., by 
assuming some form of zero sum. What remains identical in communication, 
however, is not a transmitted, but a common underlying meaning structure 
that allows the reciprocal regulation of surprises. That this meaning 
foundation is itself historical in nature, i.e., that it arises within the history of 
experience and communicative processes, is another matter altogether and 
does not contradict my thesis that communication does not transmit or 
transfer meaning, but rather requires it as pre-given and as forming a shared 
background against which informative surprises may be articulated (Luhmann 
1990: 32, cited on page 331). 
 
More pointedly, Luhmann states repeatedly that “only communication can 
communicate” (for example, 2002: 126), shifting the question of agency away from 
“people, individuals, subjects” or users back into the system or network that allows 
communication to take place. 
Yet, the key issue for Brier, as for Luhmann, is that communication is carried 
out in systems that are operationally closed. Indeed, it is closure that guarantees 
agency. As Clarke and Hansen (2009: 1-2) state, 
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it is only by theorizing the operational closure of cognizing systems that 
cultural theory can rescue agency – albeit agency of a far more complex 
variety than that of traditional humanism – from being overrun by the 
technoscientific processes that are everywhere transforming the material 
world in which we live today.  
 
This is because, as they add later, “a system is open to its environment in proportion 
to the complexity of its closure” (2009: 7). Entanglement with the environment 
correlates with systemic/organismic self-regulation – the complex closure involved 
in self-regulation is not a harbinger of autonomy or self-sufficiency but a necessary 
corollary of structural coupling (the term much used by Maturana and then 
Luhmann). So, a system like ‘the mind’ has operational closure but, in that state, 
must be open to the physiological processes of the brain; in turn, ‘the mind’, 
through its closure and because it is not simply the sum of physiological events, can 
gain knowledge of what goes on in the brain. These are arguments which have 
allowed Luhmann to investigate the structural coupling of different social systems. 
Nevertheless, Brier qualifies and extends these arguments. Closure is a 
sufficiently important pre-condition of Umwelten and social-communicative systems 
for the theories of von Uexküll and Luhmann to be compatible; however, social-
communicative systems, along with psychic systems, are not to be considered as 
truly autopoeitic in the way that biological systems are (331). This may account for 
Humberto Maturana’s oft-noted reluctance to countenance the theory of 
autopoeisis beyond biology. What is important for Brier, though, is that  
 
We construct for ourselves a “signification sphere” within which we live, and 
which we modify only if it is perturbed in a way that interests or threatens us. 
In a certain way we are monads, as Leibniz suggested in his monadology, each 
enclosed in our own self-organized world, as agreed by von Uexküll and 
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autopoiesis theory with its theory of the Multiverse and cognitive domains. 
We each consist of several closed systems such as the biological autopoiesis, 
the psychological organizational closure, and the social-communicative 
organizational closure (Luhmann 1990) that interpenetrate each other (335) 
 
Luhmann hence allows a systems theoretical investigation of the social-
communicative sphere and, to some extent, the psychic. Von Uexküll offers an 
account of closure at the level of species’ relation to their environments. Yet, 
cybersemiotics demonstrates that while such frameworks might allow for agency, 
they have no way of accounting for the quality of that agency, the very feeling which 
might promote agency within the operation of systems. This is one of the most 
penetrating criticisms of Luhmann made by Fogh Kirkeby, as Brier notes (330). Yet, 
Fogh Kirkeby does not propose the comprehensive re-thinking that cybersemiotics 
does. The latter, crucially, reveals the blind spot of the teachings of Luhmann and his 
followers: 
 
that there is no subject and no ontology of qualia and emotions in Luhmann’s 
philosophical framework, although he sometimes imports them into his theory 
in their common sense meaning, which is somewhat inconsistent. But how do 
you relate the results of a theory that does not accept subjects and persons as 
real systems back into a political and juridical system that is based on persons 
with free will who are deemed responsible for their actions? (240).  
 
Put another way, the work of Luhmann and others is savvy enough to embrace the 
idea, from von Foerster, that the enquirer or the observer is a crucial part of the 
process of observation. Yet, it is very reluctant to get its hands dirty with the raw 
material of first person experience.  
Semiotics, by contrast, is, in principle, very willing to get dirt under its 
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fingernails. As employed by Brier, semiotics gets down to the nitty gritty – not 
through reification of phenomena into certainties but by at least seizing on what is 
neglected or taken for granted by other disciplines. On more than one occasion I 
have seen Brier give papers in which he states, while lifting an arm, that “we do not 
even know what it is that allows us to do this”, demonstrating at a stroke the 
relative poverty of biology, cognitive science, psychology and sociology. His point is 
that “we” do know that there are feelings and we do know that these do not come 
from nowhere and nothing, but not from where or how they can make our body 
move in accordance with our ‘will’. This is, again, a concept that has had no place in 
the natural, technical or informational sciences on which cognitive science is 
founded. Systems theory offers a great deal to the process of conceptualization; yet 
it has contributed very little to the understanding of representational processes, and 
nothing at all in respect of affective semiosis.  
 
Qualia and motivation 
The experiental and phenomenal properties of perceptual and/or bodily experience 
– feelings, desires and thoughts are, as far as Peirce is concerned, signs.  That is 
qualia – specifically qualisigns, which require a further sign to become manifest. 
They are the prerequisite for all cognition and communication. Certainly, Brier 
presents a forceful argument for their role in exposing the insipid flavour of uni-
disciplinary reductionism: 
 
Originally educated as a biologist, I have long been skeptical about research 
programs based on the belief that mechanicism could provide an adequate 
framework for the understanding of living systems. Furthermore, from a 
psychological and semiotic point of view it does not seem likely that 
theoretical understandings of the inner world of sensations, feelings, 
signification, and volition of living systems can emerge from mechanistic or 
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functionalistic algorithmic thinking. A broader framework – both trans-
disciplinary and non-reductionist – is therefore necessary (110). 
 
For Brier, “The ability to have sense experiences and to be able to distinguish 
between qualitatively different ones (qualia) – sweet and sour, hot and cold, red and 
green – is basic to knowledge, understanding, communication, and intelligent 
reasoning” (38). Moreover, it must be the basis for any thinking through of the 
notion of the subject and subjectivity. 
Of course, the frequently chosen mode of neglecting the concept of the 
subject has been to take it for granted or to treat subjectivity as straightforward. As 
Brier points out, in Luhmann’s focus on society as communication, the embodied 
mind is simply not theorized (242). Alternatively – if I may mention a parallel 
development - poststructuralism, which, since its inception with the work of 
Benveniste, has obsessed about the subject but bracketed out emotions in favour of 
a theory of the subject as constituted by power relations alone. Elsewhere, Brier has 
noted this by referring to “the linguistic or hermeneutic view” which has had its 
impact on the quest for knowledge and the objects of that quest, such that “All that 
is left is different forms and combinations of power and meaning games in a post-
modern age” (2008: 35). Luhmann’s systems theory, like all cybernetics, has not 
been able to countenance the agency of subjects. Brier suggests that it was a 
possibility in Bertalanffy’s general system theory but even Bateson was then unable 
to build agentive action into his system. “Peirce at least has a theory”, writes Brier, 
and he sees this especially in Firstness, the realm of qualia (243). Spencer-Brown, 
too, in his embrace of “observing as an important part of basic reality” moved in the 
direction of qualia. Yet, what about more directed affect – that is, the difference 
between the potential of qualia and the set of combinations that make up 
motivation? 
Running through cybersemiotics’ sign theory is an alert to a theme that has 
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sometimes been neglected in the mainstream of semiotics: motivation. 
Cybersemiotics extends ‘motivation’, away from linguistics (see Cobley 2010b) and 
with reference, in particular, to ethology. Motivation 
 
can be said to occupy the same position within ethology as the concept of life 
in biology, or that of the law of gravity and the attraction of masses in 
Newton's classical mechanics. In other words, it is an “occult” basic concept 
that cannot be explained within the paradigm, but that cannot be ignored 
either (156). 
 
Citing (and translating) Madsen, Brier notes that psychoanalysis and American 
learning theory attempted to grasp motivation through the concept of ‘trieb’ or 
‘drive’. Yet, even these are too reductionist in their bearing to be able to 
encapsulate the notion of motivation. The problem is “immense complexity!” The 
complexity of neuro-physiological states, Brier notes, makes it necessary to always 
classify them with reference to some kind of interest or at least some point of view 
(157). 
The elusive nature of motivation places it alongside qualia with reference to 
consciousness. Indeed, “Motivation seems to be an intention just below the level of 
consciousness” (345), an occurrence which von Uexküll attempted to build it into his 
theoretical framework as “tones” (a concept close to “affordances”) but which 
corresponds to a range of investigations and theories about cognitive functions, 
from Freud’s positing of the ‘pre-conscious’ to “the well known experiments 
showing that decisions of actions seem to be made on a level below consciousness, 
and a few seconds before we become aware of them” (428). For Brier, the departure 
point of these observations is Lakoff and the idea of extensions; motivation is 
argued to come from the embodied mind and is then used by linguistic 
communication as a structural coupling. Here, motivation relies on the conceptual 
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system as a whole, rather than individual circumstances of cognitive categories 
(309). This is not a bad starting point but does not seem to be the best one for 
demonstrating the widespread embeddedness of motivation in cognition and 
communication. Rather than being immersed in the jargon of cognitive semantics, it 
would have been interesting to see what cybersemiotics makes of the work of 
Damasio, a potentially important thinker for both semiotics and cybernetics. 
Descartes’ Error, for example, is dedicated inter alia to exploring how “The organism 
actively modifies itself so that . . . interfacing [with the environment] can take place 
as well as possible” (Damasio 1994: 225). This perspective, along with the layering of 
consciousness Damasio posits, would seem to fit nicely with the Luhmannian 
perspective in cybersemiotics, as well as the question of motivation, to attempt to 
fill the “explanatory gap” (1999: 9) that exists in neurobiology in relation to qualia. It 
would also fit in nicely with the account of Peirce given in cybersemiotics (see also 
Trout 2008). 
 
Knowing and reality 
Where Damasio’s work – close to ethological thinking but not explicitly naming it -
famously re-orientates rationality as imbricated with, rather than divorced from, 
feeling and emotion, cybersemiotics re-casts knowing. It is partly in retreat from the 
“information-processing paradigm”, but it is also critical of the reification of ‘science’ 
as an object (or subject). The starting point for investigation is, instead, “the process 
of knowing in living systems” (84); science, if it is based on a physicalist perspective, 
can never really grasp its own basis in knowledge (101). As such, then, 
cybersemiotics is precisely congruent with biosemiotics. Kull (2009) notes various 
distinctions between sciences but draws a general distinction between sciences that 
have a physical approach and study ‘things’, invoking universal laws, as opposed to 
those sciences with a semiotic approach which study knowing, invoking “local 
codes”. This locality is echoed in Brier’s observation that 
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our knowledge is always contextual and therefore limited to a part of reality. 
We cannot even offer a simple description of the limits of the truth-content in 
our knowledge (models, theories) in any absolute theoretical way before 
practical testing and attempts at falsification. The border between the areas 
within which a given model determines to be true and untrue statements is 
not a smooth curve but a fractal one. When we try to generalize knowledge, it 
is always prone to failure (114). 
 
The main threat of generalized knowledge, for Brier, is solipsism: 
 
When I see the apple tree in the garden, I do not create it as such; I only create 
it in my world and give it social signification by fitting it into a recognized 
classification system. If we do not realize this, we could easily fall into a 
solipsistic idealism. The problem with solipsism is that it is a black hole. It sucks 
everything down into itself and denies the independent existence of other 
human beings with whom the observer/scientist develops language and 
explanations (195). 
 
On the other hand, in spite of the second-order discourse and the emphasis on the 
role of the inquirer, it is a mistake 
 
to propose a theory of knowledge one must dare to say more about the world 
than just that it is an infinitely deep, chaotic multiverse where we make 
structures by observing or acting. We must further theorize the processes of 
cognition and communication beyond their basis in the perturbation of and 
between closed systems to a theory of meaning (197). 
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Brier’s frame of reference for these arguments, apart from philosophy of science, is 
cognitive semantics; for example observations on the view, associated with pure 
reason and a God’s eye view of the world, that Lakoff (1987) calls ‘objectivism’ 
(264). The reason for this is that Brier sees Lakoff and Johnson as “pioneers” (297) in 
importing a modern biological perspective through cognitive semantics. The latter 
diverges from the idea that syntax is the root of meaning, opting instead for a 
pragmatic notion of basic level categories. 
Again, there is a connection with biosemiotics. Since the basic level of Lakoff 
and Johnson  is the level first understood and used by children, it is also the basis of 
language. This is consonant with Sebeok’s developmental view, derived from Peirce 
but omnipresent in Sebeok’s work and sketched late in his life in The Forms of 
Meaning (Sebeok and Danesi 2000). Sebeok’s view of the intersection of natural 
human development and the role of culture is echoed in the Uexküllian musings of 
Brier inspired by Lakoff: 
 
All human beings are equipped with the same cognitive apparatus and are 
grounded in the same embodiment, but the surrounding world determines the 
basic level because those surroundings determine what a culture defines as 
basic. A fisherman has a different understanding of what is the basic level than 
a peasant (302) 
 
Brier’s issue with cognitive semantics demonstrates not so much cognitive 
semantics’ impoverishment as cybersemiotics’ richness, particularly in respect of 
processes of knowing. He is disappointed that cognitive semantics does not draw on 
ethology, semiotics, or autopoiesis (297). 
Yet there is a further perspective on knowing in cybersemiotics which is 
derived from von Foerster: constructivism. Brier lays out the arguments about 
reality whose theoretical and  practical lacunae require a palliative: 
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It does not make sense to claim that the world exists completely 
independently of us. But neither does it make sense to claim that it is the pure 
product of our explanations or conscious imagination (231). 
 
It makes no sense to talk about reality without access to the operations that 
bring forth this result (Maturana 1990). (182). 
 
Since the rise of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory, science and 
common sense no longer have a word for the ‘stuff’ reality is made of (97). 
 
We cannot say that the world we live in has no structures, nor can we say that 
our process of knowing has no influence on these structures. We cannot claim 
that the world is basically logical and/or deterministic, nor that it is absolutely 
irrational and chaotic. We cannot say that reality is basically simple (and 
logical), nor that it is too complex to be even partially understood. We cannot 
claim that reality is basically ‘dead’ material, nor that it is basically ‘pure spirit’. 
Our theory of knowledge and knowing must be located between these 
positions (205). 
 
Of course, these polarities are not the only positions Brier identifies: there is the 
‘selfish gene’ position or ‘pure coincidence’ (91), as well as the various forms of 
reductionism he identifies in the study of Psyche (subjective idealism, 
phenomenalism, and solipsism), the study of society (conventionalism, radical social 
constructivism that includes nature as a construction, and vulgar or mechanical 
historical materialism) and the study of nature (scientism, physicalism, and 
eliminative materialism) (135-6). He applauds the abandonment of the notion of 
‘objective reality’ in second-order cybernetics, but does not give up on the idea that 
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there is some “outside reality” (93). Thus he approaches the matter through 
Maturana’s question of the relationship between the observer and the observed. 
While noting the idea of the human being able to compute invariants – Eigenvalues, 
as von Foerster demonstrates – Brier also adds that material things “seem to force 
themselves upon us with independent necessity, no matter how we choose to 
perceive or ignore them” (182). Whereas for Maturana objects are constructed only 
in language, Brier does seem to concur with him regarding the bringing forth of a 
world of objects as co-ordinations of actions with which humans describe co-
ordinations of action. Put another way, the object is not to be considered as 
individual or independent of the observer, but always as operative in a social 
domain.  
Much theorizing about signs tends to be predicated on the idea that knowing 
is really rooted in the referential capacity of signification, particularly in respect of 
linguistic signs. Yet Brier is at pains to point out that knowing often operates at the 
level of linguistic inexpressibility – Polanyi’s ‘tacit knowledge’, for instance – and 
that a fair amount of reasoning is unconscious (see Figure 2.11 on page 134). Later, 
Brier ponders the point that the meaning of ‘Life, the universe and everything’ is 
precisely beyond words (148). Yet, the issue for cybersemiotics is that linguistic and 
non-linguistic signs contribute to knowing for the reason that in order to approach 
the question of knowing it is necessary to acknowledge “that our many knowledge 
systems cause us to explain, predict, and conduct activities in a ‘multiverse’, or 
‘Umwelts’ as von Uexküll calls them, or ‘life worlds’ as the phenomenologists call 
them” (148). Yet, resorting to knowledge systems, implying many different realities, 
seems to be against the project that cybersemiotics is proposing and tantamount to 
relativism. Brier is alert enough to head this off, calling for a view “that is truly post-
modern . . . abandoning the idea that any knowledge system has a direct way to 
obtain absolute truth on any matter . . . but still allows for a fairly reliable knowledge 
of a limited number of aspects and ranges of reality” (144). Reality, of course, is 
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usually synonymous with ‘the real’ which, in turn, is synonymous with the ‘physical-
material’; Brier rejects such a unitary conception of the real. He writes, 
 
What we can measure inter-subjectively is a part of reality, meaning that it has 
an existence independent of the individual human being. But we do not know 
if this existence is completely independent of the existence of conscious 
beings. When science reifies this substance to be matter (devoid of life and 
mind, and subject only to mechanical and statistical laws) and creates a 
worldview where everything – including life and mind – comes into being 
through the self-organization of matter through evolution, this move is clearly 
self-contradictory. It leads to materialism and potentially to fundamentalism in 
the natural sciences, as evidenced by the term universe’, which indicates that 
there is a single reality that is potentially fully comprehensible by science 
(199). 
 
Put another way, the concept of ‘the real’ as ‘physical-material’ represses the 
process of knowing by which ‘the real’ can be said to be ‘the real’. Knowing 
something is not necessarily knowing something in stasis; hence, Brier insists on “a 
constructivism that goes beyond the social constructivism that takes nature for 
granted and as objective, and therefore is not able to incorporate a natural history 
of observing systems” (91). In this scenario, nature itself has to be considered as 
knowing and it should be no surprise, then, that cybersemiotics is so liberally dosed 
with insights from ethology which, arguably, has the ‘knowing’ of animals as its very 
raison d’être. Moreover, cybersemiotics is also an important current of biosemiotics 
by way of its cogent theorizing of agency in nature and the continuity of knowing. 
 
Ethology, biosemiotics and autopoiesis 
For non-Danish speakers and for non-specialists in animal studies, the discussion of 
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ethology in this volume may yet be its most desirable feature. Not only did it force 
me to think more subtly about what I know of animal communication through my 
acquaintance with semiotics but it also introduced the work of Reventlow, a figure 
hitherto unfamiliar to me and no doubt to many others. An ethologist interested in 
phenomenological psychology and gestalt psychology, Reventlow’s work is shown to 
be dovetailed with systems theory and cybernetics (165). The key concept that Brier 
analyses is the ‘rependium’, a sudden unexpected emergence of a structure from 
previous structures leading to a new, stable structure. Examples include the 
imprinting Lorenz discovered among ducklings and goslings, Reventlow’s own 
discovery of the sudden changes affecting the stickleback in courtship and the 
realization of the route to food which dawned on Köhler’s chimps. As Brier reveals, 
the rependium function presupposes mental ability (168): knowing on the part of 
the lowly stickleback subject to repeated stimuli. For him, it implies that motivation 
cannot be the simple physiological concept that it was for early ethologists; thus 
 
Reventlow seems to be in the same difficult situation as Lorenz. Both begin 
their study of behavior as dualistic, where matter and mind are in two 
different worlds. But their evolutionary theory forces them into a theory of 
continuation between the mental capacities of humans and animals, and to 
consider mental awareness, emotions, and intentionality as having survival 
value (or else they would not exist). As is clear in ethology, Reventlow sees 
that the living system to some extent creates its own ‘Umwelt’ (168). 
 
The idea of the organism’s sensoria making its world and the idea of its agency in 
relation to other phenomena in remaking that world echoes both von Uexküll 
(perceptor and effector actions) and Maturana and Varela. At certain times, the 
environment can reorganize the organism’s cognitive field into an ‘aha-experience’ 
that allows it to see its surroundings as meaningful (324). Brier notes the congruency 
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of this idea with ‘structural couplings’ (cf. Luhmann), the connections that must be 
created between a system and its environment in order to systematically sense 
anything (325). At the same time, however, Reventlow was astute enough to point 
out the difficulty in gaining knowledge of the exterior world and getting a sense of 
the animal’s perception of the world. Since neither can ever be gained in causal 
deterministic terms, there will always be an analytic leap by the observer (171). In 
Peircean terms, abduction – the observer’s leap – is where, for Brier, semiotics and 
ethology meet, “because ethology – as well as gestalt psychology – investigates the 
subconscious abductive judgments and their development through evolution in the 
form of sign stimuli” (168). 
Evolution was obviously at the forefront of ethology as it developed in the 
twentieth century. Yet, on the periphery of its research, arguably guiding its core, 
was “evolutionary epistemology”. Brier sees in this the bases of realism, proceeding 
from the observation that species with the features which enable them to adapt and 
survive will have an efficient picture of their world. In his (effectively 
deconstructionist) reading of Lorenz, Brier shows how it was an issue with which 
Lorenz grappled, even as, at each turn, he tried to shrug off the shadow of his 
teacher, von Uexküll (313-4). In general, the discussion of ethology in this volume 
nicely demonstrates the way it moves inexorably towards semiotic principles while 
sometimes desperately trying to hold them at bay with the last vestiges of 
mechanism. At all stages, Brier brings out the “continuation between the mental 
capacities of humans and animals” and, indeed, the continuity of systemic principles 
across the realm of life. Reventlow’s rependium is shown to map onto structural 
couplings which give rise to von Foerster’s Eigenvalues coinciding with von Uexküll’s 
observation in his Funktionskreis of objects arising in a stable interaction between 
the perceptual and motor parts of the nervous system (230). This continuity is of a 
piece with the biosemiotic project and is a major contribution to its as yet unsung 
cultural implications (see Cobley 2010a, forthcoming). Brier writes, 
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I know it blows a hole in much present day’s sociological self-understanding 
that biology matters for signification, but biology and its genetic, evolutionary 
and ecological theory is as much a science as mathematics, physics and 
chemistry . . . biology is foundational for a theory of meaning and signification. 
That was what Tom Sebeok saw when he started biosemiotics! (226) 
 
It is because of his belief in the implications of biosemiotics, in fact, that Brier is so 
critical of Luhmann. In retreat from biology whilst embracing principles from 
biologists, Luhmann focused on psychic and social-communicative systems as not 
primarily biological but autopoietic. Yet, as Brier argues, these can only function if 
based on a biological autopoietic system. “As a biologist and a biosemiotician”, he 
adds, “I do not believe that Luhmann takes this fact seriously enough, and he 
therefore fails to develop a theory of embodied meaning, which is why I want to 
integrate his theory with biosemiotics” (237). That is good news for Luhmann 
studies, but what about biosemiotics? What does it have to gain from 
cybersemiotics? 
In the main, biosemiotics gains from cybersemiotics the potential of an 
enlarged frame of reference and applicability. This might sound ridiculous given the 
breadth of embrace that biosemiotics exemplifies. However, I would argue that, 
thus far, biosemiotics has been pre-occupied with reforming ‘mainstream science’. 
Of course, its tentacles have reached out to cognitive science fairly significantly. Yet 
it has not really concerned itself with psychic and social-communicative systems 
despite good fledgling biosemiotic thinking taking place in these realms. This is one 
point. Another is that its concern with signs rather than, say, molecules always has 
to be qualified – Brier argues that signs are fundamental parts of reality but they 
“are an Eigenvalue established through communication” (254). So, in those 
instances where nature is considered as a set of quasi-autonomous signs in growth – 
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the example of the pansemiotic tendencies in Merrell’s work and Emmeche’s 
critique of him is given (357) – there is a need to pull back and look at the processes 
of observation in determining signs and the systems in which they operate, 
particularly in relation to the self-organization and self-making of those systems. The 
latter are not to be considered autonomous or made up of autonomous signs 
evading sociality, an argument Maturana would make: 
 
The argument is as follows: when one realizes that there is no objective reality 
for any autopoietic (biological) system, then there is no objective reality for us 
or for science. We have to put objectivity in parentheses. There are no 
autopoietic systems without an observer who ‘brings them forth’. This means 
that no theory can refer to objective reality to legitimize its claims of truth 
(180).  
 
The point is telling, but Brier criticizes Maturana for excessive reliance on 
constructivism. In introducing the orientation towards observation into 
biosemiotics, Brier is not averse to criticizing those who have inspired him along the 
way. Along with Maturana, Luhmann, as already noted, is brought to book, as are 
Maturana and Varela, with their notion of the ‘multiverse’ - created through 
observation and acts, on the one hand, alongside, on the other, their admission of 
the biological body and life as real (180). Taking a route that poststructuralism 
opened up after Heidegger but was too frightened to tread except with 
anthropocentric armour, Brier, echoing von Foerster, notes that as observers “we 
are always already a part of the world when we begin to describe it” and, further, 
“From both a biological and psychological point of view one can then add that a 
great part of our communication and thinking is not of our own (self-conscious) 
doing; rather, it is biological evolution and cultural history that signifies through us” 
(254). This seems, to me, a useful way of re-framing for psychic and social-
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communicative systems the principles of downward causation and (biological) 
continuity. The latter, of course, was broached in the guise of ‘synechism’ by Peirce. 
 
Peirce 
Although the observer and von Foerster are pivotal in this book, the figure that 
underpins all the discussion is Charles Sanders Peirce. His synechism, stated simply 
as 
 
The present writer holds that in advance of positive knowledge, the 
presumption ought to be that there is such a unity in the universe that the 
difference between mental and natural phenomena is only a difference of 
degree. Presumably, the same elements are in both, and if so, there is no 
essential difference in their intelligibility (CP 7.463 cited on page 267 of the 
volume under review) 
 
runs through both cybersemiotics and biosemiotics. Thus “Peircean semiotics”, 
writes Brier, focusing on the principle of continuity,  
 
breaks with the traditional dualistic epistemological problem of first-order 
science by framing its basic concept of cognition, signification through 
abduction, within a triadic semiotic philosophy, which is integrated into a 
theory of continuity between mind and matter (Synechism) where the three 
basic categories (Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness) are not only inside the 
perceiver’s mind, but also in the nature perceived. This is connected to the 
second important ontological belief in Peirce’s philosophy, namely, Tychism, 
that sees chance and chaos with a tendency to take habits as basic 
characteristics of Firstness leading into an evolutionary theory of mind 
(Agapism), where mind has a tendency to form habits in nature. Chaos and 
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chance is seen as a First, which is not to be explained further (for instance, by 
regularities). It is the basis of habit forming and evolution. The chaos of 
Firstness is not seen as the lack of law, as it is in mechanicism and rationalism, 
but as something full of potential qualities to be manifested individually in 
Secondness and as general habits and knowledge in dynamic objects and 
semiosis in Thirdness (Peirce 1992). Matter and mind are united in the 
continuum of Firstness and develop through “evolutionary law” into 
Secondness’ manifestations of resistance, force, dualistic concreteness, and 
the impenetrability of objects. Secondness provides what second-order 
cybernetics sees as constraints on perception and cognition occurring in 
semiosis – Thirdness of true triadic sign processes. This is the deep foundation 
of Peirce’s pragmaticism. As a result of the innovative work of Thomas Sebeok, 
Peirce’s semiotics is now interpreted as covering all living signifying systems in 
biosemiotics (355). 
 
Continuity of matter and mind is no small issue. Yet cybersemiotics’ instatement of 
Peirce as the pivot of biosemiotics and second-order cybernetics rests also on 
specific issues in semiosis. The potential of Firstness – the realm of the fundaments 
of first-person experience, affect and qualia – and its transformation in Secondness 
suffuse the processes of the plant and animal worlds as they are observed. As Brier 
points out, Secondness is not only the fixing of relations but also the enactment of 
constraints. The very Secondness of natural phenomena is what von Foerster would 
consider their “decidability”; in turn, this requires consideration of the frame in 
which phenomena are to be taken as “decidable”. That frame seems to be offered, 
in its most cogent form, by Peirce’s semiotics. 
In addition to its potential to unravel the problem of decidability, the strengths 
of Peirce’s work for cybersemiotics are shown to reside in: 
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 matter being seen as possessing an inner aspect of living feeling (effete mind) 
(27); a hylozoistic view which Peirce shares with Aristotle; 
 
 qualia and mind being installed in his metaphysics from the beginning (363); 
a rare philosophy of first person experience;  
 
 Peirce’s work being close to organicism and general systems theory (100); a 
point implied by Sebeok in 1977, see above; 
 
 the conception of pure chance as living spontaneity with a tendency to take 
habits (29); a point which links both biosemiotics and second-order 
cybernetics; 
 
 the fact than an interpretant, and therefore a sign process, must be 
established to create signification (32); an emphasis, therefore on process 
rather than objective information (cf. Bateson, Maturana, Luhmann);  
 
More pointed, still, though, is Brier’s mapping of Peirce’s categories onto second-
order cybernetic concepts. Secondness, he says, is the first distinction made by an 
observer marked by a primary sign, the Representamen. “The observer is Peirce’s 
Interpretant that belongs to Thirdness. Only through this triadic semiosis can 
cognition be created. To become information, differences must be seen as signs for 
the observer. This happens when they become internally developed Interpretants” 
(96). In fact, this is an object lesson in the kind of interdisciplinary gymnastics that 
this book is so good at but which are difficult to actually put into operation. 
In general, however, it is fairly easy to see how Peirce’s comprehensiveness as 
a thinker has been appealing to those, such as Brier, battling reductionist science. He 
demonstrates a catholic embrace of phenomena whilst promoting rigour; his 
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concepts inculcate flexibility while being useful in their own terms; but, above all, his 
thinking is evolutionary and envisages continuity across the known universe. The 
other thing for Brier is that even in his most fundamental categories – Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness – Peirce emphasizes semiotic qualities “working over 
space-time magnitudes so immense that they are beyond human comprehension” 
(351). As a result, there is attention in Peirce’s philosophy and method to the fact 
that qualia probably potentially exist from a very early stage in life but require a 
nervous system to achieve their full manifestations. They are part of the real rather 
than creations of the mind, affording cybersemiotics a perspective that is both 
realist and attentive to first-person experience. Brier sums up by noting that 
Firstness includes all known qualities (such as blue, hardness, sweetness). These 
qualities manifest themselves as ‘thing-ness’ and to be such they must be 
interpreted by a system that can recognize them as signs or habits or regularities. 
Eigenvalues, in von Foerster’s terms, established by structural couplings of 
autopoietic systems, correspond at least to part of what Peirce calls the 
Interpretant: the signs in the minds. These are the bases for those signs and 
regularities that are real and which connect Nature and Mind. They are bases which 
“exist only as potentials in a sea of spontaneously complex dynamics, including 
emotions, basic qualities, and mathematical forms”. As such, like cybersemiotics 
Peirce proposes an evolutionary science cognizant of these potentials, finding 
patterns and dynamic modes or habits, “a science of the habits of evolution and the 
meaning they come to have for the living systems created in the process” (274-5). 
Put another way, it is a science devoted to investigating knowing rather than 
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I have just two caveats regarding Brier’s account of cybersemiotics – they are the 
features of the volume that I will note here but will expand on at a later date (see 
Cobley 2010b). These are the topics of ‘languaging’ and ‘religion as knowing’. The 
first runs through the volume and demands brief comment. The second is only 
implicit. As regards ‘languaging’, Brier is usually referring to two phenomena with 
this term: the pragmatics of situations as they are constructed in signs about them; 
the specific ‘sign games’ (cf. Wittgenstein) which develop in such situations. There is 
no problem with this general notion: it demonstrates the contextual and dynamic 
bearing of cybersemiotics. Nevertheless, the terminology is confusing and derivation 
from Maturana, who seems to have had considerably less than Brier to say about 
the matter, is frustrating. The imprecision of ‘languaging’ as a term regrettably blurs 
some of the semiotic points that cybersemiotics is trying to make about the 
processes of human communication and cognition. Equally problematic are the 
mentions of religion in relation to knowing. This volume, long though it is, points to 
a huge further discussion regarding the practices that humans currently have which 
amount to knowing. Brier mentions the sciences, art, religion and politics/ideology 
(141). Why this list and not another one? Can all these practices be subsumed under 
the category of knowing? I tend to think that religion cannot and I am a bit dubious 
about art and politics. That Brier is cautious, too, is demonstrated in his publications 
appearing after this volume was published (e.g. Brier 2010). Is it possible to re-
define knowing without losing cybersemiotics? Is it possible to re-define what these 
practices do without losing the connection to knowing? These will be part of the 
ongoing debate that cybersemiotics provokes. For now, it is worth considering what 
cybersemiotics has already done. 
Cybersemiotics is a theory of information, cognition and communication. In 
itself, that is not new.  Yet it is a truly transdisciplinary theory. Brier has had a 
training in science but knows the philosophy of science. This volume evinces a 
background in cognitive science but has a comprehensive grasp of the extensive 
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sociological work of Luhmann. It is underpinned by the already transdisciplinary 
orientation of cybernetics and systems theory but is also fully informed by a deep 
reading of Peirce’s voluminous work in philosophy and logic. It draws on principles 
from linguistics that have been introduced by pragmatics and from cognitive 
semantics. Its discussion of biology, as befits Brier’s background, ranges over not just 
the history of ethology but also the ultra-theoretical work of Maturana and Varela 
and the groundbreaking findings of biosemiotics. Brier’s grasp of these areas is such 
that he does not shrink from criticizing the shortcomings of any of the above. 
The critique in Cybersemiotics, coupled with its proposals for a 
transdisciplinary vision, compels readers to view life, consciousness and cultural 
meaning as constituted by the continuities of nature and evolution. It challenges 
physicalist science, with its ideal of third person knowledge, replacing it with an 
imperative to consider first person embodied consciousness. Likewise, evolutionary 
biology, with its thermo-dynamic bent, reliance on the idea of genes as mechanisms 
and its fixation on ideal empirical objects, is shown to be stifling its potential all the 
time that it does not develop a theory of meaning and agency in nature. Following 
Uexküll, cybersemiotics does maintain a conception of the real which is beyond 
meaning and agency. Yet, unlike much contemporary cultural analysis or 
constructivism which sees knowledge as constructions and plays of language and 
power – cybersemiotics is predicated on embodied first person consciousness in 
relation to nature as continuous over plant and animal existence. It has no need to 
rely on the ‘culturalist subject’ whose world is supposedly a discursively constructed 
phantasm. In this way, cybersemiotics is ‘phaneroscopic’, philosophically speaking: it 
puts the first person point of view in the foreground, proceeding from meaningful 
experiences (for example, qualia) before positing an opposed, exclusive subject and 
object as the basis for knowledge. In this Brier is really Peircean: unlike those, 
including quite a few Peirce scholars, who focus almost solely on Thirdness, 
cybersemiotics takes Firstness as a realm of experience very seriously indeed. 
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More specifically, Cybersemiotics promotes a new perspective, carries out new 
syntheses and demonstrates congruencies which should all contribute to 
knowledge. Its thesis regarding the observer and second order thinking will 
hopefully spread out from systems theory to the sciences, social sciences and 
humanities, particularly in respect of how the idea of ‘information’ is used. ‘First 
person experience’ will hopefully be a concept which seeps into thinking across 
disciplines and, especially, among those who eschew the concept of individualism 
without wishing to underestimate the importance of affect to people. Certainly, 
theorizing qualia in semiotics is crucial; as is the re-thinking of motivation – never a 
purely linguistic phenomenon - after cognitive science. In that sphere of knowing 
‘beyond’ qualia, cybersemiotics’ synthesis is illuminating because of its mapping of 
Eigenvalues, generated by the process of the structural coupling that is unique to 
autopoiesis, onto the Interpretant as a ‘sign in our mind’. Closure and autopoiesis 
contribute an understanding of the inner world of the organism (and, consequently 
first-person views) as continuous with matter. The same project of registering 
continuity is characteristic of (Peircean) biosemiotics. Effectively, as Brier shows, 
Peircean biosemiotics offers a theory of mind and meaning to the notion of 
cognition inherent in second-order cybernetics and autopoiesis. Meanwhile, second-
order cybernetics offers biosemiotics a way to theorize the systematization of 
cognition whilst enhancing biosemiotics’ orientation to knowing, honing the 
understanding of the role of the observer in cognition, and negotiating 
constructivism and realism to help clarify the understanding of the agency of 
organisms within Umwelten. 
Organism, environment, cognition, signs and reality – none of them issues to 
be settled by one discipline. A consummate transdisciplinarian, the last word is 
probably best left to Brier: 
 
As second-order cybernetics takes systems science and cybernetics to a new 
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level by including the observer, biosemiotics takes semiotics to a new level by 
including all living systems in semiosis. They both take this step through a bio-
constructivism, where they see all living systems constructing their own “life-
world”. In biosemiotics it is often called ‘Umwelt’ from von Uexküll’s work. 
Maturana speaks of the organisms’ ‘cognitive domain’. Von Foerster sees a 
cognitive world constructed of ‘Eigenvalues’ of the nervous system’s cognitive 
processes . . . In all these systems of thought the bio-constructive view leads to 
an idea of “closure”. The term is mostly used in connection with autopoiesis, 
but both von Foerster and von Uexküll have clear indications that the “life 
world” –– or “signification sphere” as I call it –– is all there is for an organism. 
They all agree that there is no stream of “information” from the environment 
going directly into the cognitive system of the organism that can be picked up 
and give a more or less ‘objective’ picture of the ‘real environment’. But all 
acknowledge that ‘reality’ or ‘the environment’ is to be viewed as some kind of 
limit that puts ‘constraint’ on the possible ways an organism can exist as an 
individual. Von Foerster is most explicit around accepting that the 
environment has to have energy and structure, and von Uexküll also seems to 
accept some kind of real world outside the many Umwelts, since he calls these 
‘subjective worlds’. They all agree that life and cognition are two sides of the 
same thing. Peirce and Sebeok use the term ‘semiosis’ and ‘signification’ for 




Barthes, R. 1964. Eléments de sémiologie. Paris: Seuil. 
Benveniste, E. 1939. “Nature du signe linguistique”. Acta Linguistica I: 23-29. 
Brier, S. 2008 “The paradigm of Peircean biosemiotics”. Signs – International Journal 
of Semiotics, vol 2: 20-81. 
Signs vol. 3: pp. 69-107, 2010  
ISSN: 1902-8822  
 105 
Brier, S. 2010. “Cybersemiotics: an evolutionary world view going beyond entropy 
and information in to the question of meaning” 12 
Clarke, B. and Hansen, M. B. N. 2009. “Introduction: neocybernetic emergence”. In: 
Clarke and Hansen (eds.) Emergence and Embodiment: New Essays on Second-
Order Systems Theory, Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press. 
Cobley, P. 2010a. “The cultural implications of biosemiotics”. Biosemiotics 3 (3). 
Cobley, P. 2010b. “Cybersemiotics and human modeling” Entropy 12 
Cobley, P. (forthcoming) Cultural Implications of Biosemiotics, Scranton and London: 
University of Scranton Press. 
Cobley, P. and Randviir, A. 2009. “What is sociosemiotics?” In: Cobley and Randviir 
(eds.) Sociosemiotica special issue of Semiotica 173 (1-2): 1-39. 
Damasio, A. 1994. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Damasio, A. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of 
Consciousness, London: Vintage. 
Hoffmeyer, J. 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. Trans. B. J. Haveland, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Hoffmeyer, J. 1998. Surfaces inside surfaces. On the origin of agency and life. 
Cybernetics & Human Knowing, 5: 33–42. 
Hoffmeyer, J. 1999. “Order out of indeterminacy”. Semiotica, 127 (1-4): 321-344. 
Hoffmeyer, J. (ed.) 2008a. A Legacy for Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as a 
Precursor to Biosemiotics, Dordrecht: Springer. 
Hoffmeyer, J. (2008b. Biosemiotics. An Examination into the Signs of Life and the Life 
of Signs. Scranton: Scranton University Press. 
Hoffmeyer, J. 2009. “Semiotics of nature” In: P. Cobley (ed.) The Routledge 
Companion to Semiotics. London: Routledge. 
Signs vol. 3: pp. 69-107, 2010  
ISSN: 1902-8822  
 106 
Hoffmeyer, J. and Emmeche, C. 2007. “Code-duality and the semiotics of nature”. 
Revised version in M. Barbieri, (ed.) Biosemiotics: Information, Codes and Signs 
in Living Systems. New York: Nova. 
Kress, G. R. 1993. “Against arbitrariness: the social production of the sign as a 
foundational issue in critical discourse analysis”. Discourse and Society 4 (2): 
169-91. 
Kull, K. 2009. “Biosemiotics: to know, what life knows”, Cybernetics and Human 
Knowing, 16 (3-4): 81-88. 
Lakoff, G. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About 
the Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Luhmann, N. 1990. Essays on Self-Reference, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Luhmann, N. 2002. Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of 
Modernity, (ed.) W. Rasch, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Martinet, A. 1960. Éléments de linguistique générale, Paris: Armand Colin. 
Randviir, A. and Cobley, P. 2009 “Sociosemiotics” . In: P. Cobley (ed.) The Routledge 
Companion to Semiotics, London: Routledge. 
Sebeok, T. A. 1977. “Ecumenicalism in semiotics”. In: Sebeok (ed.) A Perfusion of 
Signs, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press.  
Sebeok, T. A. and Danesi, M. 2000. The Forms of Meaning: Modeling Systems Theory 
and Semiotic Analysis, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Shannon, C. E. 1948. “A mathematical theory of communication”. Bell System 
Technical Journal, 27 (July): 379-423 
Trout, L. M. 2008. “C. S. Peirce, Antonio Damasio, and embodied cognition: a 
contemporary post-Darwinian account of feeling and emotion.  In the 
“cognition series”’ Contemporary Pragmatism, 5 (1): 79-108.  
Vološinov, V. N. 1973. Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. L. Matejka 
and I. R. Titunik, New York: Seminar Press 
Signs vol. 3: pp. 69-107, 2010  
ISSN: 1902-8822  
 107 
von Foerster, H. 1991. “Through the eyes of the other”. In F. Steier (ed.) Research 
and Reflexivity, London: Sage. 
 
 
